A New Progressive Patriotism. by Denham, John
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Denham, J. (2017), A New Progressive 
Patriotism. The Political Quarterly, 88: 97–105. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12326, which has been 
published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12326. This article may be used for 
non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 © 2017 Wiley-Blackwell 
 
 
 
 
A new Progressive Patriotism  
 
John Denham 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ‘progressive dilemma’ has changed. For David Marquand it was primarily about how the 
centre left appealed ‘beyond Labourism’. Today, social democracy is losing its key social base as 
economic change undermines mass working class culture and organisation. For all the realities of 
dramatic economic and social change, the need to hold capital to account and to bend markets to 
the common good is as powerful as ever. Yet it is becoming ever harder to create an electoral or 
political majority for such an idea in societies that are fractured and divided. The fundamental bond 
between voters and parties depends on political identity relationships; old ones are fading, new 
ones need to be created. Migration in particular has had a corrosive effect on a significant part of 
the electorate’s traditional identification with Labour. This essay argues that the most dynamic 
politics in advanced capitalist societies are those of nation, people and place. The strategic 
challenge for the left is to create a new progressive patriotism that can embed radical ideas in a 
common sense of national purpose. 
  
2. Capitalism is still the challenge - the historic mission of social democracy 
 
Social democracy was born in response to the majority’s interest in challenging unrestrained 
capitalism. Left to themselves, markets consistently create and re-create unaccountable 
concentrations of power and wealth, pitting the interests of a small group of powerful and wealthy 
individuals, corporations and financial institutions against the interests of the majority, within 
nations and across the world. The consequence is inequality nationally and globally, insecurity, 
instability and uncertainty. 
 
These risks have been underlined by the sluggish and uneven response to the banking crisis – 
itself born from the illusion that markets could solve their own problems. The threat of a new crash 
is ever-present. Some countries have enjoyed rapid growth, as have some cities including London. 
But the patterns of growth have been uneven, the impact of new technologies skewed, throwing up 
a slew of problems. The EU, once seen by the centre left as a vehicle for both capitalist growth and 
social justice, is stalled without delivering the dynamic, innovative, world leading region it promised. 
Even in wealthy countries millions are excluded from the benefits of growth. Markets like UK 
housing are failing the majority of young people. Inequality is rising sharply. Global inequalities of 
wealth and income are driving mass migration on a scale that is unsustainable, erodes 
communities, and is politically toxic. 
 
On the other hand, despite these concerns global markets cannot fail to impress with their 
dynamism and entrepreneurialism. In 20 years, globalisation has lifted more billions out of poverty 
in developing countries than 70 years of aid. It is hard to imagine a world where the centre left 
turns its back on the innovation and creativity that is fostered by properly functioning markets.   As 
David Marquand described, the left has always oscillated between an ill-defined anti-market 
socialism, and attempts to deliver social justice within a market system. But the challenge of “The 
Progressive Dilemma’ has not turned out the way he expected. 
 
20 years ago progressive politicians were confident. New Labour was about to win the 1997 UK 
election; social democrats who were winning in Europe shared a similar world view to the Clinton 
Democrats. Notwithstanding the tensions between an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ view of markets and the more 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Denham, J. (2017), A New Progressive 
Patriotism. The Political Quarterly, 88: 97–105. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12326, which has been 
published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12326. This article may be used for 
non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 © 2017 Wiley-Blackwell 
 
 
 
state orientated traditions of continental Europe the left was winning the arguments. But, not for the 
first time, the left was making the mistake of believing that capitalism had changed in ways that 
worked in the interests of progressive politics. 
 
In the 1950s, revisionists like Crosland thought that Keynesian economic management, coupled to 
the development of technocratically managed companies, could ensure growth and full 
employment. The challenge appeared to be to open opportunities to all for fulfilling lives by 
education, meritocracy and the progressive redistribution of the proceeds of growth.  The 
stagnation of the 1970s showed the limits of this approach in the UK while successive oil crises 
and persistent high inflation ushered in a period of global slowdown and uncertainty. 
 
In the 1990s advocates of the Third Way admired the manner in which economic globalisation was 
driving global growth and development. The challenge now, they thought, was to ensure that 
nations, as well as communities and individuals, could benefit. A combination of free markets, light 
touch regulation, dynamic welfare (combining flexicurity, redistribution and ‘rights and 
responsibilities’) and social investment in education, early years and skills became the policy 
package. The accusation that the left simply bought wholesale into ‘neo-liberalism’ is misplaced. 
The aspiration was always to use policy for progressive ends. 
 
But the limited tools deemed available proved quite inadequate to bend global capital to the public 
good. The light regulation thought necessary in the global economy ushered in instability, banking 
crisis and recession. The near decade long legacy has been stagnating wages, high 
unemployment in some countries and increasingly insecure labour markets in others, stalled 
investment and productivity and rapidly widening inequality. The aftermath has been a public 
austerity that has slashed away at the social protection and public services that were central to the 
post-war consensus. 
 
The challenge remains to strike the right balance between markets and the public interest. But the 
lesson of the last half century is that we should not imagine we can find a ‘steady-state’ in which 
both governments and the private sector know their remit and responsibilities. Dynamic markets 
rarely develop in the way we expect. The extraordinary rapid introduction and spread of new 
technologies makes the future ever harder to predict. Markets find opportunities that neither states 
nor other market players can spot. The problems created by markets turn out to be unpredictable 
too.   Instead of seeking a predictable and stable settlement, the centre left must envisage a 
constant effort, continuously fashioned and refashioned, to challenge and hold to account the most 
powerful economic forces. The measures that could challenge both market failures that emerge as 
well as the unacceptable concentrations of power and influence that dynamic markets create are 
not a mystery. Action can be taken against market abuse, tax havens can be wound up and 
transparency made the norm; regulation can favour business activity that serves a public good 
over damaging speculation; the state can foster research; public procurement policies can create 
markets innovative goods; competition policy can favour the new entrant over current market 
leaders and apply a public interest test to takeovers and foreign ownership; intellectual property 
rights can favour innovation and enterprise and resist monopoly exploitation; financial reform can 
create institutions focused on sustainable regional economies;  free trades unions and transparent 
remuneration policy can bring work place justice.  
 
The idea of state and popular institutions continually and actively challenging market power needs 
to become the new ‘common sense’ of our society. Just as the right made free-market liberalism 
the common sense of economics for thirty years, social democrats need to embed the assertion of 
the common good and the public interest over pure market outcomes as central to our national 
purpose. This is not an impossible goal. The banking crisis has led to much greater awareness of 
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corporate and personal tax avoidance, and widening inequalities of wealth. Popular concern about 
elements of business behaviour has risen sharply. Yet social democracy is in decline. Public anger 
at market excess has not translated into political support for action to tackle it. Across Western 
Europe working class voters are deserting social democratic parties, often for parties that play to a 
very different tune.   Political philosophies once banished to the fringes are re-emerging. 
At national level, it is easy - not least in Britain - to point to mistakes made by the left’s leaders, but 
the widespread decline of social democracy demands a more profound explanation. 
Social democracy is a collectivist philosophy. It has and will always depend on the support of a 
large section of society sharing a strong collective sense of identity and a common interest. 
Popular support for social democracy has always rested on the politics of identity. Social 
democratic parties were not supported simply or even primarily for their policies or ideologies but 
because they were seen as expressing the collective interests of the industrial working class. Yet 
what Marquand called ‘labourism’ is shrinking in size and political weight. On the left no new 
collective identity has yet been shaped to fill its place. To understand why, we need to consider the 
crucial role that political identity relationships play in support for political parties. 
 
 
3. Political identity and political relationships 
 
Although Marquand thought that Labour’s identification with the organised industrial working class 
was politically limiting, he recognised its historic importance: ‘Labour rose as far as it did because 
[the primacy of working class interests] seemed to millions of working class voters to make sense 
of their experiences.’ Solid working class culture was built on a network of relationships - big 
workplaces, tight communities, family links in and out of work, chapel, church, social club, trade 
union. In that culture, voting Labour was a way of expressing working class identity. It was both 
more, and less, than a political relationship; it was a statement of ‘who we are’, and ‘who is on our 
side’. The experiences that forged that identity also forged its own values; a tough minded 
collectivism where the community looked after its own but looked askance at those who didn’t pull 
their weight; a community that took pride in defending its interests against threatening change. 
What is loosely called ‘social conservatism’ is not an ideological disease but may well be the 
values of people who knew that if they didn’t look after themselves, no one else would. 
 
The work and social institutions that sustained a collectivist, labourist culture have shrunk rapidly 
over the past 30 years. As that identity loses substance, the umbilical link with voting Labour 
withers.  That’s what former Labour voters mean when they say ‘Labour doesn’t stand for people 
like me anymore’. Labour and its sister parties have lost touch with socially conservative working 
class voters concerned about economic marginalisation, security, community, unfairness in the 
welfare system and the impact of mass migration. But these are not simple policy failures that can 
be rectified by a better political programme or more persuasive leaders.  
 
Social democracy’s political identity relationship with those voters has decayed for reasons beyond 
policy. Contrary to the belief and hopes of party activists, most voters do not vote for programmes, 
manifestos or ideologies. They vote for political parties with which they identify. Not so long ago, 
Labour canvassers were told to ask ‘which party do you most closely identify with’. The question 
recognised that a voters’ choice of party was not necessarily the one with the best policies, the 
best leader, or even best for you personally. It was the party that best expressed who you thought 
you were. 
 
The changing economy alone would have weakened the relationship with Labour, but rapid 
migration has had a toxic and understandable impact in vulnerable communities. It seemed to 
challenge and undermine the last residual sense of who ‘we’ are - ‘the people who live round here’. 
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Labour’s association with massive and rapid migration was a confirmation that the party no longer 
stood for them. 
 
Labour’s problem is not restricted to its declining industrial working class base. Its identity 
relationship with other groups of voters is under threat. For example Labour still benefits from a 
political identity relationship with black and Asian voters established when its anti-racism opposed 
overt Tory bigotry. But identities formed decades ago are now strained in a more diverse and 
accepting society. Younger generations have issues and aspirations that are not defined by the 
migrant experience. Class, religious practice and socially conservative attitudes are eroding the 
identity relationship and Labour is unclear how to establish a new relationship for the future 
 
Labour is also failing to make inroads into areas of the country and society where it has never been 
strong. Labour has no base in swathes of southern England. Huge numbers would never dream of 
voting Labour: even in good years the party has only pepper pot representation. However, there is 
no significant difference in public attitudes between the south and other English regions. Average 
incomes may be somewhat higher in some parts of the South, but even in those areas many do 
not enjoy the wealth around them. It is the lack of any political identity relationship that is Labour’s 
problem. Millions of southern voters live in communities that have never had a strong industrial 
working class base. Nothing in their own experience of work and community has created that 
sense of Labour identity that was once so strong in mining districts and some industrial towns. 
Indeed, Labour is clearly seen to stand for people who are not like them. 
 
This is not a purely English experience. Across Western Europe, once powerful social democratic 
parties are losing votes to political forces that exploit identity politics effectively: often from the 
right, sometimes from the far left or as in Scotland, from the centre-left. Only Pasok in Greece has 
suffered a greater electoral decline than Labour in Scotland, but nowhere has social democracy 
emerged unscathed including Germany’s SPD. . There are particular factors in each country, but 
there are common threads: working class identity has been disrupted by economic change and the 
social and economic impact of mass migration; and the modern economy is not generating new 
class identities.  
 
The exception to these weakening identity relationships is the relative strength of support from a 
younger, more diverse, liberal section of society that is mirrored by the dominant membership of 
the Labour Party (and to a considerable extent in other European social democratic parties). 
Though this part of society is growing, particularly in larger cities and in some university towns, it is 
by no means large enough to provide a sufficient base for a new radical politics.  In the debate that 
has consumed Labour since 2015, the Corbyn leadership emphasises the need to create a party 
that reflects its memberships’ world view. This underlines the extent to which his support is as 
much about identity as it is about politics. It allows little space for other world views, let alone the 
idea that politics involves engaging with people with different ideas and different views. 
 
4. Today’s progressive dilemma 
 
The changing shape of the economy and employment, divergent educational paths, 
heterogeneous lifestyles, new technologies, decline in the churches and the social, economic and 
cultural impact of mass migration have all undermined the sense of ‘us’ ‘we’ ‘our common good’ 
‘our collective interest’ on which social democratic collectivism could thrive. Our individual 
experiences of work and society are diverging, and far from sustaining common values, they are 
undermining them. Far from strengthening shared values, institutions like the welfare state have 
become new sources of division: people look at the entitlements of their neighbours with suspicion. 
No longer believing that governments can serve a common interest rather than their own, they 
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accept failures like the housing market as beyond policy solutions.  The self-organised institutions 
where people once came together to pray, or study, or socialise, or organise, are weaker. Where 
they are strong they tend to bring together people who already identify with each other, something 
that is even more marked in the on line world. 
 
This produces a profound paradox. On the one hand our analysis and experience of modern 
capitalism suggests that a large majority of people, including the great majority of those engaged in 
business, share an interest in a sustained effort to restrain the concentration of power and wealth 
in the hands of a few. On the other contemporary global capitalism is undermining the culture and 
institutions that sustained a common identity of economic interest in the organized, industrialised , 
working.  
 
Social democracy needs a new politics of identity that will sustain the majority needed to change 
the common sense of economic life. This will  only happen if a shared interest in holding capital to 
account is reflected in a shared sense of identity; a sense of identity that can be expressed in 
support for progressive politic parties and progressive values. This is a nutshell is today’s 
progressive dilemma.  
 
5. Nation, people and place - the new politics of identity 
 
The opportunity for a new identity politics is arising from the popular reaction to globalised 
capitalism. Global capitalism is not producing new class identities it is generating and 
strengthening other identities.  As collective class identities weaken, the new identities of nation, 
people and place are filling the gap. The human response to the sweep and power of global 
capitalism has not been a global sense of citizenship. Instead people have turned to more local 
identities to provide a sense of security in a fast changing and unstable world.  
 
Across Europe and the USA, the most dynamic political forces come from a new identity politics 
rooted in nation, people and place. In the UK, the parties that have made most progress in the past 
ten years are UKIP and the SNP. Though their political programmes are very different (as Sanders 
was different to Trump) they have built a political identity relationship with voters based on 
‘understanding and speaking for people like us’. Political identity relationships also help explain the 
relative resilience of Labour in Wales, and the appeal of Syriza in Greece. By contrast the least 
dynamic forces are those of disappearing identities - the industrial working class and, less 
remarked but still important , an older conservatism of tradition, services and status that also feels 
discomforted by globalised market capitalism.  
 
Our nations give us a historic sense of identity, a rooted sense of who we are, and the values we 
share. In a world that seems to say ‘we are all on our own’, nation can give a sense of shared 
purpose and offers traditions of odds overcome and powerful forces defeated. The renewed sense 
of national identity may well be strongest amongst the parts of society that have done least well 
socially, economically and politically in the past thirty years. This alone makes the nation a key 
identity for social democrats wanting to re-connect with former voters.  National identity, though, is 
felt much more widely across the electorate. It is one of the few identities in modern societies 
capable of providing a unifying rather than a divisive identity.   
 
At the same time, where we live offers a more local identity. These local identities can be a source 
of pride and even resistance against an overbearing centre in a centralised nation like England. 
They are where we say we are most at home with our neighbours, and where the practical task of 
building cohesion from diverse communities may be most advanced. The politics of place, too, 
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unites rather than divides. Labour councils have often found it easier to forge alliances of common 
interest across communities and business than has the party at national level. 
 
The spontaneous growth of identity politics of nation and place has enormous progressive potential 
if the social democratic left can understand and engage with it. Quite understandably, progressives 
shudder at the dangerous rhetoric and actions of the populist right. But the politics of nation, 
people and place have not been created by the right; they have been a natural human response to 
a world of insecurity, where major problems appear beyond the power of governments.  The right 
though has been much quicker to exploit this change, and to define the terms of the debate. But, 
as the SNP, Plaid, Syriza and others have shown, the politics of nation, people and place can also 
be harnessed by the centre, left and far-left. In the hands of the right, ‘the people’ can be ethnic 
and defensive, but ‘the people’ can also be everyone who shares this place. The dangers are real, 
but so are the opportunities. 
 
National identity bridges the gulfs emerging across our society; in the places we live often we have 
our strongest shared identities. In both the majority define ‘the people’ as all the people who live 
here, not those of one ethnicity, faith or class. If social democratic politics are to have a future they 
will need to become progressive patriotic parties of nation, people and place. This cannot be a 
tactical, electoral appeal to sections of the alienated working class. It has to become a new 
operating paradigm; a new way of conceiving of these parties as best able to speak for the 
identities their fellow citizens increasingly share. 
 
6. Progressive patriotism 
 
In Britain, the decline of the old Labour class identity is further weakened by the decline of British 
identity as a single, unifying national identity.  Over recent decades, both Scottish and Welsh 
identities have been asserted more strongly. There is now a growing sense also of English identity 
and of English political interests.  Our argument for a progressive patriotic politics is not restricted 
to any individual nation. In the British context, the future of the Union may well depend on the 
development of progressive patriotic politics in each nation, coming together in common interest 
rathr than the expression of history or sentiment. How Labour might turn that growing English 
identity into a progressive force is the concern of the rest of this essay.  
 
 
We consider six major challenges to creating a party of progressive patriotism:  
 
-  holding  capital to account in the national interest and making this a progressive ‘national’ 
cause 
- identifying shared national values that express a strong sense of ‘who we are’ and what we 
have in common 
- building institutions that will sustain common identities and values without reliance or 
dependence on the state or political activists 
- enabling the left  to master the cultural politics of national identity building 
- fostering such a politics within the realities of today’s Labour Party. 
- making a progressive patriotic argument for a post Brexit England and post-Brexit Britain  
 
 
Holding capital to account in the ‘national interest’ 
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It may be no accident that the social fragmentation caused by economic change has been so 
marked across the whole UK. No state  has arguably gone as far in allowing the take-over of 
domestically  owned companies, the spread  of private companies into the ownership and 
management of the public sphere, the acquisition of  land and homes by foreign companies, or the 
penetration of corrupt overseas money into our financial, legal and property markets. In short, no 
country has gone as far in abandoning the notion of a common good in favour of the outcomes of 
unrestrained markets. Yet the ever greater penetration of the UK economy by foreign ownership of 
companies, public spaces, public services, former public utilities and private housing has not 
delivered the improvements in productivity and investment that liberal market theories promised. 
 
The starting point for  progressive patriotic politics is to re-assert a doctrine of the national interest 
and put the interests of the majority at the heart of economic policy. Progressive patriotic politics 
would have the confidence to make national interest judgements on issues of foreign ownership 
and investment.  It would be actively engaged with private business in shaping Britain’s economy. 
It would reform the rules on corporate governance; restructure investment and finance, support 
innovation and shape regulation, procurement and long-term infrastructure in order to create new 
market opportunities and investment certainty for Britain’s most competitive companies. It would 
demonstrate new confidence in the ability of the public sector to deliver for the public good. 
 
Identifying shared national values for progressive change 
 
After the EU referendum a crude caricature emerged of an unbridgeable divide between 
cosmopolitan liberals and the ‘left behind’ working class. This picture leaves out millions of people - 
probably the majority - and it suggests shared values cannot be found and built upon in our 
society.  
. 
Popular values have indeed diverged, hollowing out the ‘centre ground’. Voters disposed to radical 
change want more radical change. People concerned about insecurity and change are more 
insecure. People who look first at what a politics offers them are less inclined to believe anyone 
can deliver. Popular values determine the scope for political change. However, there is much more 
potential for common ground than much commentary implies, so long as it is understood that the 
values of the liberal, cosmopolitans cannot t be the centre ground of a national consensus. Three 
areas of common ground need to be built on.  
 
 First, the NHS remains popular despite its flaws. The view that ‘we all pay in and it’s there 
when we need it’ reflects a deeply held view about the kind of country we want to be and 
how we relate one to another.  
 
 Secondly welfare. The present system with narrow means-tested, needs based scope 
fosters myths of abuse and is out of step with popular ideas of fairness and contribution. 
Yet ‘focus groups’ have shown consistently strong support for a welfare system that looks 
after those most in need, but at the same time takes into account  contribution based on  
time living, earning and paying in within a given community  in determining rights and 
benefits. 
 
 Thirdly migration. There is broad support for sensibly managed immigration so long as it is 
seen as under control, and the impact measured and mitigated. The politics of nation, 
people and place requires some limits to the pace of migration and change, but does not 
demand xenophobic responses. There is a deep depth of tolerance for difference, provided 
there is no special treatment and everyone ‘plays be the rules’. 
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There is a toughness and practicality to popular values that modern social democrats can find 
difficult. The insistence that to benefit fully from society you should be a contributing member of it is 
demanding and to an extent illiberal. It is, however, a pre-condition for forging the collective identity 
that a progressive patriotism demands. The role of social democracy is to forge these widely 
shared assumptions into a set of progressive values that are not the property of the left, but an 
expression of the values of the nation. As with economic policy, the strategic aim is to embed 
progressive values within the 'common sense of the nation'. 
 
Building institutions that sustain progressive patriotic values 
 
In the past progressive values were nurtured in popular institutions autonomous from the state. 
Today unions are in decline; large workplaces and their social institutions are shrinking; most 
church congregations are falling; trustee based pension schemes are closed to new members; 
former mutual savings institutions became drivers of the banking crisis; the English tradition of 
voluntarism is being undermined by the contract culture; and public universities are now part of a 
market for higher education.  
 
The picture is not entirely bleak. There is a dynamic ‘third sector’: charities and volunteering remain 
storing. But the progressive patriotic left will need to spend as much time fostering new institutions 
that can develop and sustain their own collective identities as it will working on state delivered 
policy solutions. We will need new popular institutions, favoring community ownership of energy 
production and distribution, new mutuals for social care provision, community owned schools and 
member trustees for the growing assets of NEST. 
 
The politics of place goes with the grain of the need to decentralise and devolve power to local 
cities and counties. Decentralisation, devolution and empowered local leadership will be the key to 
improved economic performance, more even regional economic growth and more equal and 
inclusive growth. The same empowered leadership and stronger local institutions can provide the 
cultural creativity and leadership that will strengthen local identities. 
 
Mastering the politics of national identity building 
 
Nations cannot be built on abstract liberal principles. At a high level, the values of democracy, 
equal treatment, and the rule of law now legally defined as ‘British values’ are shared by all other 
democratic nations. It is our particular history - how we came to religious tolerance, how 
democratic rights were achieved, and the evolution of our approach to law - that makes these 
national values. Knowing these were achieved through struggles and campaigns - they do not 
come with the water or the air - makes the nation something that is constantly being built and re-
built generation by generation. 
  
In our history we find ideas, like the common weal or the common good that constantly reappear in 
support of popular demand to hold the powerful to account. Knowing our history explains why we 
are diverse, and have been for much longer than many think. It is also the starting point for building 
an argument that diversity, with the languages and links they bring, itself makes us well equipped 
to succeed in a globalised world. 
 
The imperative of nation-building supports the need to bring together communities divided by race 
faith and recent migration. Building and strengthening local identities is also crucial in creating a 
genuinely cohesive society out of one that has experienced such rapid demographic change.  A 
progressive patriotic national story must be more than a collection of groups distinguished by race, 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Denham, J. (2017), A New Progressive 
Patriotism. The Political Quarterly, 88: 97–105. doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12326, which has been 
published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12326. This article may be used for 
non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 © 2017 Wiley-Blackwell 
 
 
 
faith and history trying to live in the same place. It demands a shared national story of how we all 
came to be here, and what sort of country we want to l build together. And in today’s Britain, this 
means stories of the individual nations as well as what we share together. 
 
Making Labour a progressive patriotic party 
 
David Marquand wanted Labour to reach beyond its labourist base. Today the challenge is to 
reach beyond the comfort zone of its increasingly graduate, middle class, liberal and public sector 
membership and the places where this gains electoral support. The recent leadership contest 
disguised the extent to which both dominant wings of Labour are uncomfortable with much of the 
nation they want to represent.  
 
For Labour, progressive politics of nation, people and place provides the opportunity to win back 
lost voters. It opens up the possibility of establishing new relationships with voters who have never 
shared the labourist tradition and whose personal experiences have been different, like those in 
southern England.  
 
Across most of western Europe, most social democrats seem to prefer staying firmly in their 
comfort zones while the politics of the populist right and left gain support. The reinvention of the 
Labour in the UK is as challenging as anywhere. In the complexities of the UK, Labour will need to 
reflect both national and British identities. Scottish Labour will have to find a compelling national 
story of Scotland within the Union is essential if it is to recover. Welsh Labour has already sought 
to combine progressive Labour values with a distinct national story. Labour’s debate about 
England is only just starting, though the essential calls for an ‘English Labour Party’ within UK 
Labour are growing. 
 
Making a progressive patriotic argument for a post Brexit Britain  
 
Labour’s approach to Brexit will provide the first chance to express a progressive patriotism. 
Most Labour activists and voters rightly supported Remain but the Leave vote has created a new 
politics and expectations, including amongst the Remain voters who harboured deep reservations 
about the current EU offer. Though it would have been better to argue for reform from within, the 
left is in danger of arguing for a cut price, second rate membership, accepting free movement in 
turn for single market access but little influence on decision-making. Such an outcome  
would further fracture our society and politics, weaken Labour’s appeal to its erstwhile supporters 
and create no new support. 
 
The progressive patriotic option is to accept the Brexit decision and set out a radical approach to 
our new status. This should be in stark contrast to the global, liberalising, anglosphere approach of 
the leading Brexiteers. In the longer term Britain’s future might well be within a reformed EU, but 
for now the priority should be to set out what a progressive patriotism needs from Brexit in four key 
areas: immigration, national economic policy, international trade deals and international leadership.  
 
 Labour should argue for an end to free movement in its current form, enabling limits to be 
placed on EU as well as global migration. The party should also advocate effective planning 
for population change, setting out how the social, cultural, economic and public service 
impact of change (including that from existing new migrants) will be handled. 
 
 A progressive national economic policy would make full use of the freedom from single-
market rules - particularly around state aid and procurement - that would allow a new 
national focus to our economy.  
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 Labour should campaign for the introduction of new national interest competition policies.  
 
 In trade policy, the party must resist the desire of the global liberals to open our economy 
and public services to damaging unfair competition. 
 
 Labour should make it clear that being outside the EU does not mean that we have lost 
confidence in Britain’s ability to offer global leadership on climate change, security, financial 
reform and other issues. 
 
Labour should be explicit about its desire to heal the divisions, building a nation around shared 
values. Some will object that this approach takes no account of the realities of EU negotiations, but 
Labour is a long way from having to lead in those talks.  The party needs a sharp break from a 
politics that is defined by elite conversations. A nation that is confident and united about what it 
wants is more likely to achieve a good outcome than one that is fearful and divided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
